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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

The court found three sources of the discharged water: (1) rainfall;
(2) groundwater withdrawn into the canals from the areas being
drained; and (3) seepage from the lake. Additionally, it found that
each of these sources fell within the CWA exemptions as either
"agricultural storm water discharge or "return flows from irrigation
agriculture." Closter Farms was thus not required to obtain a permit
for any waters discharged into Lake Okeechobee that originated on its
lands.
Finally, the court found insufficient evidence in the record to
conclude that Closter Farms discharged non-agricultural pollutants
into Lake Okeechobee. The only testimony that supported such a
conclusion was from an environmental manager with the Florida
Department of Environmental Protection. Without identifying any
studies or research, the manager tentatively concluded that runoff
from the waste treatment plant, the county road and the county park
The court found such evidence
likely contributed pollutants.
insufficient to conclude these sources discharged any pollutants,
affirming the district court's ruling.
Brian L. Martin

Georgia v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 302 F.3d 1242 (11th
Cir. 2002) (holding that parties can intervene as a matter of right
when the parties have a legally protected interest in water quantity,
such as, the right to an equitable apportionment of water flowing
through the interstate stream and the right to hydropower
production).
The State of Georgia ("Georgia") sued the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia to compel increased releases of water
from a reservoir managed by the Corps. The district court denied a
motion to intervene submitted by State of Florida ("Florida") and
Southeastern Federal Power Customers, Inc. ("SeFPC"). The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that both Florida
and SeFPC could intervene as a matter of right.
The Chattahoochee River originates in Georgia and becomes the
Apalachicola River at the Florida Border. The Flint River joins with
the Chattahoochee and the Apalachicola Rivers to form the
Florida,
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Basin ("ACF Basin").
share
the
water
supply
of
these
interconnected
Georgia and Alabama
rivers, and in 1997 enacted the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint
("ACF") Compact. The ACF Compact required the states to negotiate
water allocation, however, no agreement was ever reached. In the
1940s, Congress authorized the Corps to build and manage the Buford
dam across the Chattahoochee River. The resultant lake, Lake Lanier,
is within the ACF Basin and thus subject to the ACF Compact. In 2000,
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Georgia made a request to the Corps for increased water releases from
Buford Dam and increased withdrawals from Lake Lanier to
accommodate the municipal and industrial needs of Atlanta. After the
Corps failed to respond for nine months, Georgia filed suit against the
Corps. Subsequently, Florida and SeFPC filed a motion to intervene.
The district court denied both motions to intervene. The appellate
court reviewed de novo.
The issue before the appellate court was whether the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provided for intervention as a matter of right for
Florida and/or SeFPC. Before a party can intervene as a matter of
right, it must: (1) make a timely motion to intervene; (2) show that it
has an interest in the subject matter of the suit; (3) show that its ability
to protect that interest may be impaired by the disposition of the suit;
and (4) show that the existing parties in the suit cannot adequately
protect that interest.
Florida made a timely motion to intervene and thereby satisfied
the first requirement. Turning to the second requirement, the court
concluded that Florida possessed the required interest in the subject
matter of the litigation. Even though the remedy sought by Georgia
would occur within Georgia's borders, it would have a practical effect
on the quantity and quality of the Apalachicola River, water to which
Florida had a right under the ACF Compact. Additionally, the court
concluded that irrespective of the ACF Compact, Florida had a
protectable interest because a state has a right to an equitable
apportionment of water flowing through an interstate stream located
within its borders.
In reference to the third requirement, the court concluded that
Florida's interest would be impaired by disposition of the suit because
Florida did not have access to the two alternative means suggested by
Georgia-the ACF Compact negotiations and filing an original action
in the United States Supreme Court. Florida did not have a clear and
compulsory right to be heard by the Supreme Court, nor did Florida
have a remedy under the ACF Compact since a water allocation
agreement had not been finalized. Under the last requirement, the
proposed intervener must show that the existing parties could not
adequately represent their interest, but this burden is minimal. The
court of appeals concluded the Corps could not represent Florida's
interest because the Corps had no independent stake in the quantity
of water reaching the Apalachicola River.
The appellate court also allowed SeFPC, the hydropower
purchaser, to intervene as a matter of right because it also met the four
criteria for intervention. First, SeFPC had a legally protectable interest
in the production of hydropower at the dam because the amount and
power of water that SeFPC received from Buford Dam would be
diminished if Georgia's request was granted. Secondly, a ruling in this
case would have a stare decisis effect on SeFPC's separate suit (filed
several months prior to the subject case) against the Corps; therefore,
the court concluded that SeFPC's interests would be impaired by the
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denial of intervention. Thirdly, the Corps could not adequately
represent the purchaser's economic interests, and lastly, the motion to
intervene was timely.
Lisa M. Thompson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Diablo Grande, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d
1059 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that plaintiff satisfied standing and
subject matter jurisdiction requirements of the Clean Water Act, and
classifying general construction activity as a point source).
California Sportfishing Protection Alliance ("CSPA") was a
California nonprofit public benefit corporation with an estimated
membership of 10,000. Diablo Grande, Inc. ("Diablo") was a limited
partnership building a golf resort on 29,500 acres of land west of
Patterson, California. CSPA filed suit against Diablo for violating the
conditions of their General Permit for Storm Water Discharges
Associated with Construction Activity ("General Permit") in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of California. CSPA
claimed this violation introduced pollutants to Salado Creek. CSPA
sought an injunction ordering Diablo to: (1) operate its construction
in compliance with their state permit; (2) provide CSPA with proof of
its compliance with the Clean Water Act ("CWA") for a one year
period; (3) contribute payments to a court-approved environmental
remediation fund; (4) pay civil penalties on a per day of violation basis;
and (5) pay CSPA's attorneys' fees. Both sides filed motions for
summary judgment pertaining to: standing; subject matter jurisdiction;
the definition of "navigable water of the United States"; and defining
what material facts were required of a party asserting a violation of the
CWA.
CSPA asserted the following three arguments: (1) its members had
standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests at issue were
germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim nor
the relief requested required individual member participation. CSPA
brought its complaint on behalf of associate members. Since Diablo
could not show that at least one of CSPA's members would not have
standing in this suit, the court found that CSPA had standing to sue. It
also held that CSPA's state purpose did not need include a certain
activity in order for that activity to be germane to CSPA's purpose. It
followed that enforcement of the CWA was sufficiently germane to
CSPA's purpose to justify standing. Diablo alternately argued that
CSPA lacked standing because there was no evidence of any fish in
Salado Creek. However, CSPA offered evidence establishing the
presence of both bluegill and bullhead fish in the creek and

